A record of an event made relevant for purposes of maintaining a security log. Typical uses include detection of intrusion attempts such as operations, privacy, security, maintenance, and monitoring for inappropriate usage. performance analysis.

Based on IHE-ATNA.

Identifier for a family of Partitions the event. For example, a menu item, program, rule, policy, function code, application name audit event into one or URL. It identifies the performed function. more categories that can be used to filter searching, to govern access control and/or to guide system behavior.

Categorization might be done automatically (inferred by code) or manually by user assertion. The absence of a category MAY limit the ability to determine when the element SHOULD be handled, so strong consideration SHOULD be given to how systems will be able to determine category values for legacy data and how data that cannot be categorized will be handled. As well, some categories might not be mutually exclusive, so systems SHOULD prepare for multiple declared categories - even within a single category 'axis'. In general, there SHOULD NOT be a 'strong' binding ('required' or 'extensible') on the category element overall. Instead, the element can be sliced and bindings can be asserted that apply to particular repetitions.

Identifier Describes what happened. The most specific codes for the category of event.

This field enables queries of messages by implementation-defined event categories.

Indicator for type of action performed during the event that generated the audit.

This broadly indicates what kind of action was done on the AuditEvent.entity by the AuditEvent.agent.

Indicates and enables segmentation of various severity including debugging from critical.

ATNA will map this to the SYSLOG PRI element.

The time or period during which the activity occurred.

The time or period can be a little arbitrary; where possible, the time should SHOULD correspond to human assessment of the activity time.

The time when the event was recorded.

This ties an event to a specific date and time. Security audits typically require a consistent time base (e.g. UTC), to eliminate time-zone issues arising from geographical distribution.

In a distributed system, some sort of common time base (e.g. an NTP [RFC1305] server) is a good implementation tactic.

Indicates whether the event succeeded or failed. A free text descripiton can be given in outcome.text.

when a code is given there must be one code from the given codeSystem, and MAY be other equivilant codes from other codeSystems (for example http response codes such as 2xx, 4xx, or 5xx).

In some cases a "success" MAY be partial, for example, an incomplete or interrupted transfer of a radiological study. For the purpose of establishing accountability, these distinctions are not relevant.

Indicates whether the event succeeded or failed.

when a code is given there must be one code from the given codeSystem.

In some cases a "success" may MAY be partial, for example, an incomplete or interrupted transfer of a radiological study. For the purpose of establishing accountability, these distinctions are not relevant.

A free Additional details about the error. This MAY be a text description of the outcome of error or a system code that identifies the event. error.

A human readable description of the error issue SHOULD be placed in details.text.

The purposeOfUse (reason) authorization (e.g., PurposeOfUse) that was used during the event being recorded.

Record of any relevant security context, not restricted to purposeOfUse valueSet. May include security compartments, refrain, obligation, or other security tags.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse AuditEvent.agent.authorization when you know that it is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. AuditEvent.authorization. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

Allows tracing of authorization for the events and tracking whether proposals/recommendations were acted upon.

Allows tracing of authorization for the audit event and tracking whether proposals/recommendations were acted upon.

The patient element is available to enable deterministic tracking of activities that involve the patient as the subject of the data used in an activity.

When the .patient is populated it SHALL be accurate to the subject of the used data. The .patient SHALL NOT be populated when the used data used/created/updated/deleted (.entity) by the activity does not involve a subject. Note that when the patient is an agent, they will be recorded as an agent. When the Patient resource is Created, Updated, or Deleted it will be recorded as an entity. May also affect access control.

This will typically be the encounter the event occurred, but some events MAY be initiated prior to or after the official completion of an encounter but still be tied to the context of the encounter (e.g. pre-admission lab tests).

Links the audit event to the Encounter context. May also affect access control.

This will typically be the encounter the audit event was created during, but some audit events MAY be initiated prior to or after the official completion of an encounter but still be tied to the context of the encounter (e.g. pre-admission lab tests).

An actor taking an active role in the event or activity that is logged.

An agent can be a person, an organization, software, device, or other actors that may MAY be ascribed responsibility.

Several agents may MAY be associated (i.e. have some responsibility for an activity) with an event or activity.

For example, an activity may MAY be initiated by one user for other users or involve more than one user. However, only one user may MAY be the initiator/requestor for the activity.

When a network are used in an event being recorded, there SHOULD be distinct agent elements for the known actors using the network. The agent with a network detail would be the responsible agent for use of that network.

Specification The Functional Role of the participation type the user plays when performing the event.

Functional roles reflect functional aspects of relationships between entities. Functional roles are bound to the realization/performance of acts, where actions might be concatenated to an activity or even to a process. This element will hold the functional role that the agent played in the activity that is the focus of this Provenance. Where an agent played multiple functional roles, they will be listed as multiple .agent elements representing each functional participation. See ISO 21298:2018 - Health Informatics - Functional and structural roles, and ISO 22600-2:2014 - Health Informatics - Privilege Management and Access Control - Part 2: formal models.

For example: assembler, author, prescriber, signer, investigator, etc.

The structural roles of the agent indicating the agent's competency. The security role that enabling the user was acting under, that come from local codes defined by agent with respect to the access control security system (e.g. RBAC, ABAC) used activity.

This value ties an audited event Structural roles reflect the structural aspects of relationships between entities. Structural roles describe prerequisites, feasibilities, or competences for acts. Functional roles reflect functional aspects of relationships between entities. Functional roles are bound to a user's role(s). It is an optional value that the realization/performance of acts, where actions might be used concatenated to group events for analysis by user functional role categories. an activity or even to a process. See ISO 21298:2018 - Health Informatics - Functional and structural roles, and ISO 22600-2:2014 - Health Informatics - Privilege Management and Access Control - Part 2: formal models..

Should be roles relevant to the event. Should not be an exhaustive list of roles. For example: Chief-of-Radiology, Nurse, Physician, Medical-Student, etc.

Reference to who this agent is that was involved in the event.

This field ties an audit event to a specific resource or identifier.

Where a User ID is available it will go into who.identifier. AuditEvent.agent.altId Element Id AuditEvent.agent.altId Definition Alternative agent Identifier. For a human, this should be a user identifier text string from authentication system. This identifier would be one known to a common authentication system (e.g. single sign-on), if available. Cardinality 0..1 Type string Requirements In some situations, Where a human name of the user may authenticate with one identity but, to access a specific application system, may use a synonymous identify. For example, some "single sign on" implementations (human readable) it will do this. The alternative identifier would then be the original identify used for authentication, and the User ID is the one known to and used by the application. go into who.display.

Indicator that the user is or is not the requestor, or initiator, for the event being audited.

This value is used to distinguish between requestor-users and recipient-users. For example, one person may MAY initiate a report-output to be sent to another user.

There can only be one initiator. If the initiator is not clear, then do not choose any one agent as the initiator.

Where the agent location is known, the agent location when the event occurred.

The policy or plan Where the policy(ies) are known that authorized the activity being recorded. agent participation in the event. Typically, a single activity may MAY have multiple applicable policies, such as patient consent, guarantor funding, etc. The policy would also indicate the security token used.

This value is used retrospectively to determine the authorization policies.

For example: Where an OAuth token authorizes, the unique identifier from the OAuth token is placed into the policy element Where a policy engine (e.g. XACML) holds policy logic, the unique policy identifier is placed into the policy element.

Type of media involved. Used when When the event is about exporting/importing onto media. utilizes a network there SHOULD be an agent describing the local system, and an agent describing remote system, with the network interface details.

Logical When a network location for application activity, if protocol is used the activity endpoint is associated with the agent most directly using the endpoint. This is usually the software agent that has a implemented the application level protocol. Preference is to define network location. in terms of a Reference(Endpoint), or URI; use string only when address or hostname is all that is known. When encoding using string it is best to encode using the formal canonical host name, but if you can't, then you can encode numeric in Literal address form using square brackets '[]' as a v4 string (in dotted notation), or v6 string (in colon notation).

An identifier for When remote network endpoint is known, another agent representing the remote agent would indicate the remote network access point endpoint used. Convention is to indicate data flowing from Source to Destination. The convention for Search, given data flows both ways (query parameters vs results), is to have the Source as the initiator of the user device for Search Transaction, and the audit event. Destination the responder to the Search transaction.

This could be a device id, IP address or some other identifier associated with a device. The authorization (e.g., PurposeOfUse) that was used during the event being recorded.

The reason (purpose Record of use), specific any relevant security context, not restricted to this agent, that was used during the event being recorded. purposeOfUse valueSet. May include security compartments, refrain, obligation, or other security tags.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse AuditEvent.agent.authorization when you know that is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. AuditEvent.authorization. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

The system actor that is reporting the event.

The event is reported by one source.

Since multi-tier, distributed, or composite applications make source identification ambiguous, this collection Events are reported by the actor that detected them. This MAY be one of fields may repeat for each application or process actively involved in the event. For example, multiple value-sets can identify participating web servers, application processes, and database server threads in an n-tier distributed application. Passive event participants (e.g. low-level network transports) need not actors, but MAY also be identified. different. The actor MAY be a human such as a medical-records clerk disclosing data manually, that clerk would be the source for the record of disclosure.

Logical source location within the healthcare enterprise network. For example, a hospital or other provider location within a multi-entity provider group.

This value differentiates among the sites in a multi-site enterprise health information system.

Identifier of the source where the event was detected.

This field ties the event to a specific source system. It may MAY be used to group events for analysis according to where the event was detected.

Code specifying the type of source where event originated.

This field indicates which type of source is identified by the Audit Source ID. It is an optional value that may MAY be used to group events for analysis according to the type of source where the event occurred.

Specific instances of data or objects that have been accessed.

The event may MAY have other entities involved.

Required unless the values for event identification, agent identification, and audit source identification are sufficient to document the entire auditable event. Because events may MAY have more than one entity, this group can be a repeating set of values.

Identifies a specific instance of the entity. The reference should SHOULD be version specific. This is allowed to be a Parameters resource.

The type of the object that was involved Use .what.display when all you have is a string (e.g. ParticipantObjectName). Use .what.identifier when you have an entity not in this audit event. FHIR form.

Code representing the role the entity played in the event being audited.

For some detailed audit analysis it may MAY be necessary to indicate a more granular type of entity, based on the application role it serves.

This can be used to provide an audit trail Security labels for data, over time, as it passes through the system. identified entity.

This field identifies the security labels for a specific instance of an object, such as a patient, to detect/track privacy and security issues.

This field may be used in a query/report to identify audit events for a specific person. For example, where multiple synonymous Copied from entity identifiers (patient number, medical record number, encounter number, etc.) have been used. meta security tags.

Text that describes the entity in more detail.

The query parameters for a query-type entities.

For query events, it may MAY be necessary to capture the actual query input to the query process in order to identify the specific event. Because of differences among query implementations and data encoding for them, this is a base 64 encoded data blob. It may MAY be subsequently decoded or interpreted by downstream audit analysis processing.

The meaning and secondary-encoding of the content of base64 encoded blob is specific to the AuditEvent.type, AuditEvent.subtype, AuditEvent.entity.type, and AuditEvent.entity.role. The base64 is a general-use and safe container for event specific data blobs regardless of the encoding used by the transaction being recorded. An AuditEvent consuming application must understand the event it is consuming and the formats used by the event. For example, if auditing an Oracle network database access, the Oracle formats must be understood as they will be simply encoded in the base64binary blob.

The DICOM AuditMessage schema does not support both .name and .query being populated.

Tagged value pairs for conveying additional information about the entity.

Implementation-defined data about specific details of the object accessed or used.

The type name of extra detail provided in the value. This element is the tag for the value. Where a simple string is used for the tag name, use the CodeableConcept.display element.

The value of the extra detail.

Should not duplicate the entity value unless absolutely necessary.

The value can be string when known entity is attributed to be a string, else base64 encoding should be used an agent to protect binary or undefined content. The meaning and secondary-encoding of express the content of base64 encoded blob is specific to agent's responsibility for that entity in the AuditEvent.type, AuditEvent.subtype, AuditEvent.entity.type, and AuditEvent.entity.role. The base64 activity. This is most used to indicate when persistence media (the entity) are used by an agent. For example when importing data from a general-use device, the device would be described in an entity, and safe container for event specific the user importing data blobs regardless of from that media would be indicated as the encoding entity.agent.

A usecase where one AuditEvent.entity.agent is used by where the transaction being recorded. An AuditEvent consuming application must understand Entity that was used in the event it creation/updating of a target resource, is consuming and not in the formats used by context of the event. For example if auditing an Oracle network database access, same custodianship as the Oracle formats must target resource, and thus the meaning of AuditEvent.entity.agent is to say that the entity referenced is managed elsewhere and that this Agent provided access to it. This would be understood similar to where the Entity being referenced is managed outside FHIR, such as they will through HL7 V2, v3, or XDS. This might be simply encoded where the Entity being referenced is managed in another FHIR resource server. Thus it explains the base64binary blob. provenance of that Entity's use in the context of this AuditEvent activity.